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RECENT BOOKS 
BOOK REVIEWS 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL PROCEDURE. VOLS. 4 & 5. 
By Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller. St. Paul, Minn.: West. 
1969. Pp. xxiii, 647; xiv, 880. $22 ea. 
Review I 
The legal profession is fortunate that two of the nation's best-
qualified scholars, lawyers, and teachers of law-Charles Alan Wright 
and Arthur R. Miller-have been chosen to write a completely new 
multivolume work on federal civil practice and procedure. The com-
bined experiences and abilities of these two men ensure the success 
of their uncompleted work, which is designed to replace the vener-
able Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, as revised 
by Professor Wright during the past ten years. The need to rewrite 
rather than revise the Barron & Holtzoff volumes has been apparent 
for some time. Wholesale revisions and proposed changes in both 
the Civil and Criminal Federal Rules of Procedure have made this 
need a compelling one. 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were overhauled and 
comprehensively revised by amendments which became effective 
July I, 1966. Extensive changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were made at approximately the same time. The astonishing 
impact of at least one of those changes, the amendments to rule 23 
governing class actions, has not yet been fully realized, but the great 
importance of the changed practice under that rule is undeniable. 
Additional important changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, primarily in the sensitive area of discovery, went into effect on 
July I, 1970. Basic Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were 
adopted in 1967 and became effective July I, 1968. In addition to 
these changes in the federal rules, Congress has enacted important 
statutory provisions and changes which affect federal civil and 
criminal procedure. For example, in 1968 Congress created the Fed-
eral Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.1 The Federal Magis-
trates Act of 19682 is expected to become effective in 1971.3 Further, 
the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation was approved 
by the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1968. 
Since the revision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
I. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
3. The Act becomes effective either when the first magistrate assumes office within 
each judicial district pursuant to the Act, or on the third anniversary of the Act, 
whichever event occurs earlier. Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 402, 82 Stat. 
1108. 
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seemed to be in a state of temporary repose after 1966, it was possible 
for Professor Wright to write the first three volumes of this new 
multivolume work on federal practice and procedure while awaiting 
the pending revisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce~ure. These 
:first three volumes have been published as Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, by Charles Alan Wright.4 Now 
Professors Wright and Miller, as joint authors, have completed 
the :first two volumes of the planned series on civil practice and 
procedure. These initial volumes are marked by the excellence ex-
pected of the authors. 
The co-authors open with a concise and comprehensive chapter 
on the history of procedure in the federal courts. The following 
chapters deal in order with rules 1 to 12, inclusive. Although, on 
a reading, rules I to 12 appear to deal with fairly simple proce-
dures, the appearances are deceptive. For example, in dealing with 
the objectives and applications of pleading a claim for relief under 
rule 8, the authors expose the latent inherent complexities of that 
rule. They supply comprehensive coverage of difficult questions of 
pleading jurisdiction and of sufficiency of the statement of the claim 
for relief in all branches of civil practice. 
Another example of the excellence of the :first two civil procedure 
volumes is found in the sections on service of process and personal 
jurisdiction. In these sections the authors recognize the difficult ques-
tions and review the authorities in an expert manner. As they do 
throughout the work, Professors Wright and Miller support their 
conclusions concerning the requirements of the federal rules with 
lucid discussions of the history, purposes, and philosophy of the rules. 
They also review the state of the critical comments in legal literature, 
offer some wholesome criticism of their own, and predict future trends 
in the law, in a manner likely to contribute to the realization of those 
predictions. 
In addition to the quality of the completed volumes themselves, 
the most impressive recommendations for this uncompleted multivol-
ume work are the credentials of the authors. These credentials are 
emphasized by Justice Tom C. Clark in his thoughtful Foreword 
in volume 4. 
Charles Alan Wright is presently the Charles T. McCormick 
Professor of Law of the University of Texas Law School. He has 
served on the faculties of the law schools of Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, Harvard, and Yale. He has taught in the summer sessions of 
the law schools of the Universities of Michigan, Colorado, North 
Carolina, Utah, and California. Professor Wright has worked in the 
:field of procedural improvement, serving as a member of the Ad-
4. See Lumbard, Book Review, 67 MICH, L. REv. 1640 (1969); Shadoan, Book Re-
view, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1646 (1969). 
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visory Committee on Civil Rules and of the Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States. He also served as Reporter for the Study of Divi-
sion of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts for the Ameri-
can Law Institute. In addition, Professor Wright is the author of 
the widely used hornbook on the law of federal courts.I' 
Arthur R. Miller possesses a wide assortment of talents and has 
had exceptional experiences which qualify him to participate as co-
author of this work. Professor Miller practiced law in New York 
following his graduation from Harvard Law School. Thereafter, he 
served as Associate Director of the Columbia Law Project on Inter-
national Procedure and as Lecturer at the Columbia University 
School of Law. He was a member of the faculty of the School of Law 
of the University of Minnesota until 1965, when he accepted his 
present position as Professor of Law at the University of Michigan 
Law School. He was co-author of a manual and a multivolume work 
on New York Civil Practice.6 He is a draftsman of the Uniform In-
terstate and International Procedure Act. In addition, Professor 
Miller serves as an active member of the American Bar Association 
Special Committee on Economic and Scientific Proof and of its 
Special Committee on Complex and M ultidistrict Litigation. As a 
member of this Special Committee, Professor Miller contributed 
materially to the drafting of the Manual for Complex and Multi-
district Litigation. In recent years, he has engaged in special study, 
teaching, and ·writing in the new field of computers and the law, 
an experience which gives him special competence in this impor-
tant field and a unique understanding of its profound effects on 
procedural law. 
Federal Practice and Procedure is in bound volume form with 
pockets in each volume for supplementary material. The entire work 
will not be finished for some time. Although the greatest part of 
Federal Practice and Procedure work remains to be published, the 
sample available in Civil Procedure volumes 4 and 5 indicates that 
the work will be a necessary part of the libraries of all federal practi-
tioners and judges and of all teachers of federal procedure and prac-
tice. 
William H. Becker, 
Chief Judge, 
United States District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri 
5. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 1970). 
6. J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, MANUAL CPLR (1967); J. WEINSTEIN, H. 
KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE (1963). 
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Review II 
This Review is concerned only with two volumes-volumes 4 and 
5-of what is to be a completely new, eighteen-volume edition of the 
encyclopedic Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright and Miller).1 
These volumes begin the topic of civil procedure. Chapter 1 of 
volume 4 serves as an introduction to the subject, dealing briefly 
but informatively with the history of procedure in the federal courts. 
Volume 4 then proceeds, in chapters 2 and 3, to deal with rules 
I through 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Volume 5 
continues with a treatment of rules 7 through 12. This Review, 
dealing as it does with a work designed as a practitioner's tool 
rather than as a scholar's delight, will consider how Federal Practice 
and Procedure measures up as a choice for the practitioner's library. 
Before beginning this task, however, your reviewer must initially 
acknowledge several difficulties. The temporary index to Wright and 
Miller is not yet available at the time of this writing.2 In addition, 
volumes 4 and 5 are self-confessedly incomplete, in that each volume 
contains cross references to sections that will be contained in future 
volumes. Finally, it is extremely difficult to present a full and fair 
analysis of an eighteen-volume work on the basis of its first two 
volumes. Persisting, however, in the face of these difficuties and in 
the face of his personal admiration and friendship for the authors, 
Professors Wright and Miller, your reviewer will proceed to "tell 
it like it is." 
Although comparisons may be odious, and, indeed, are often 
irrelevant, there is no escaping their value when appraising the tools 
of a trade. Thus, your reviewer must grace-or disgrace-this Re-
view by a comparison with Moore's Federal Practice (Moore's).3 
On the physical side, each of the two treatises has its merits. 
Granted an efficient page replacement service, the looseleaf structure 
of Moore's would offer a distinct technical advantage over the other-
wise handier hardback form of Wright and Miller, which can only 
be updated with periodic "pocket part" supplements. Wright and 
Miller is already somewhat dated because of the recent amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective July 1, 1970. In 
partial compensation for this defect, however, Professor Wright's 
intimate participation for many years in the rule-amending process 
has enabled him to provide footnote caveats galore. Moreover, the 
sloppy replacement-sheet service of Moore's publishers almost matches 
I. The first three volumes are devoted to criminal procedure, insofar as an un-
seduced reader of the seductive brochure of the publisher can tell. 
2. The temporary index is now available.-Ed. 
3. J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1961). Moore's is published by Matthew 
Bender &: Co., Inc., of New York City. 
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the built-in obsolescence preferred by the publishers of Wright and 
Miller. Finally, West Publishing Company cannot be surpassed for 
clear, easily read typography or for sheer excellence as book manu-
facturers. On balance, therefore, Wright and Miller is physically the 
better book, and your reviewer always looks to that treatise first. 
This reviewer finds the citation policy followed by West (Wright 
and Miller) to be rather grating. Although both treatises follow the 
self-laudatory practice of using boldface type to note that the author 
of a cited opinion has seen fit to cite a work from the same publishing 
house, rival publishing enterprises and reporting services are simply 
ignored by West. This omission of references to rival publications 
is often a genuine handicap, as, for example, in the patent field, 
where one such publication is of primary reliance. A policy of ig-
noring one's competitor might be excused as commercial zeal (after 
all, the homunculi of the law-publishing world can pay their obei-
sance to the colossus by publishing their own comparative tables), 
but it is regrettable that the price of such commercialism must be 
paid by the practitioner in search of professional assistance. 
A further problem with the citation policy of Wright and Miller 
is the failure to distinguish the federal districts within a state. The 
difference in case law between, for example, the Northern and 
Southern Districts of New York may control the result in any partic-
ular case, yet this treatise refers to both districts as "D.C.N.Y." 
All this comparative carping leads simply to the conclusion that 
Wright and Miller has virtues on the format side that Moore's lacks, 
and vice versa. 
On the merits-which is an incongruous note, stylistically, in 
discussing procedural treatises-again the honors are divided. Wright 
and Miller is much more readable, and your reviewer's ego was 
certainly swelled by footnotes 94 and 95 to section 1029 in volume 
4 to the effect that "statements on the interpretation of the rules of 
individual members of the [Civil Rules Advisory] Committee are 
entitled to considerable respect" (p. 132). 
This reviewer was disappointed to discover that the Wright 
and Miller treatment (sections 1023 and 1251) of the interrelation 
between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the patent laws 
of the United States4 is even sketchier than the minimal treatment 
found in Moore's (paragraphs 1.03[4] and 8.19[3] and [4]). Neither 
Moore's nor Wright and Miller fully exposes the anomaly that, 
regardless of pretrial, no "discovery" of prior art in a patent case 
can be "binding" until "thirty days before trial."5 It is difficult to 
argue that any of the amendments made to the Civil Rules since 
the Patent Act of 1952 affect this anomaly. Indeed, the choice made 
4. !l5 U.S.C. §§ 1-29!! (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
5. !l5 u.s.c. § 282 (1964). 
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in the 1970 amendments (rule 26(e)) against imposing a continuing 
duty to update discovery answers given seems to clinch the triumph 
of 35 U.S.C. § 282 over the Civil Rules. Perhaps the forthcoming 
volume of Wright and Miller dealing with rule 16, Pre-Trial Pro-
cedure; Formulating Issues, will suggest just how a patent case can 
be finally "prettied" earlier than thirty days before actual trial 
begins. 
Your reviewer tried to put Wright and Miller to the proof of prac-
tical application, a difficult task with only rules 1 to 12 yet dealt with. 
A rule 12 motion was the proving ground. This brought in rules 
6 and 7. The particular motion involved rule 12(b)(2), (3), (4), and 
(5) defenses served at the last minute permitted under rule 12(a). 
The motion was clearly deficient in its statement of grounds under 
rule 7(b)(l), but, when the requirement for later presentation of 
"points and authorities" under local rules was timely complied with, 
the deficiencies were remedied before the opposing party had to 
take a position. The local rules set up a timetable clearly at variance 
with rule 6(d), that is to say, always exceeding the five-day delay 
therein provided unless a special order of court is obtained. Both 
Wright and Miller and Moore's point out the existence of local court 
rules shortening the rule 6(d) requirement, and both set forth a 
caveat to consult the local rules and a suggestion that the validity of 
such local rules is questionable. However, neither treatise offers real 
guidance concerning the effect of a later presentation of "points and 
authorities" in curing a deficient statement of grounds in the motion 
itself. Hopefully, Wright and Miller will deal more explicitly with 
this subject in the sections dealing with rule 83, Rules by District 
Courts, and your reviewer can get Professors Wright and Miller's un-
equivocal view of whether the moving party in the cited situation was 
in default, had waived his defenses cited in his motion, or had been 
saved by the local rule. 
On the other hand, comparing Moore's treatment of motions 
under rule 12(b)(6) with that provided by Wright and Miller, the 
balance here seemed to weigh in favor of the latter. Professor Moore 
devotes twenty-one pages, with very little commentary, to motions 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim; Wright and Miller devote 
thirty pages, including substantial commentary, to this subject plus 
an additional nine pages of "illustrative cases" which are thought-
fully catalogued. Beyond the mere bulk of pages, moreover, Pro-
fessors Wright and Miller appear to go into far greater detail in 
describing the actual mechanics of a rule 12(b)(6) motion. Post-
answer methods of asserting a rule 12(b)(6) motion when a novel 
theory of liability is being explored, and a comprehensive treatment 
of the effect of rules 12(g) and (h) are all found in Wright and Miller, 
but not in Moore's. While Moore's discussion of rule 12(b)(6) is, 
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to be sure, quite adequate, it fails to treat many of the issues con-
sidered in some detail by Wright and Miller. Therefore, Wright and 
Miller must be judged a substantial improvement in this area. 
Finally, there are areas that neither Moore's nor Wright and 
Miller covered thoroughly enough to suit your reviewer. One of 
these areas was the treatment of the notion of "hearing" as used in 
rules 6, 7, and 12. Neither treatise attempts to explain that notion; 
on the contrary, the existence of a consensus about the meaning of 
"hearing" seems to be presumed. There are numerous local rules 
(see rule 78) which provide for routine submission of contested 
motions on "the papers" but none of them known to your reviewer 
attempts to define what constitutes the "hearing" under it. Your 
reviewer cannot rid himself of the conviction that the basic structure 
of the Civil Rules contemplates an appearance in person for oral 
argument at the bar of the court and that rule 78 has encouraged 
tampering with the symmetry of that structure. Omissions such as 
this emphasize that no treatise so far appears to have reached every 
aspect of the broad subject of federal civil procedure. 
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to review thoroughly 
and fairly a treatise such as Wright and Miller or Moore's. Too 
many criticisms have the unfortunate effect of drawing attention 
away from what is written and toward what is not. Therefore, your 
reviewer deems it wise to cut this review short at this point. For the 
practitioner preparing to purchase either Wright and Miller or 
Moore's, your reviewer offers this personal judgment. Wright and 
Af iller is handier, better-organized, easier on the eyes, and the better 
place to look first for an authoritative answer to the routine questions 
of federal civil practice and procedure. If an office is not to have 
both Moore's and Wright and Miller, and Moore's is reasonably 
available in someone else's library, it should prefer Wright and 
Miller; if the office has to rely entirely on its own library resources, 
perhaps it should prefer Moore's. 
W. Brown Morton, Jr., 
Member of the New York, Virginia, 
and District of Columbia Bars 
